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While it is a general rule that a State cannot engage in any
purely private trade or business, the extent to which it may go in
the exercise of its lawful powers is yet unfixed and uncertain.
The attempt of the State of South Carolina to regulate the liquor
traffic by itself engaging in it to the exclusion of all private indi-
viduals was watched with interest by the whole country and the
decision of the State Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the
so-called "Dispensary Act" is interesting. McCullough v. Brown,
19 S. E. Rep. 458. A majority of the court held the law to be
unconstitutional. The reasoning of the court is about as follows:
That intoxicating liquor is a lawful subject of commerce and not
mala in se; and as such it is an inalienable right of citizens to deal
in it, which can only be taken away by the State in the exercise
of its police power. That this so-called dispensary law was not a
police regulation because it did not prohibit, but rather encouraged
sales of liquor; all sales being made by, and the profits going to,
the State. That a State cannot regulate itself or a business car-
ied on by itself in the exercise of its police power. In regard to
the power of the legislature to engage the State in trade, the
majority opinion said it had none. "Not because there is any
express prohibition, to that effect in the Constitution, but because
it is utterly at variance with the very idea of civil government."
The assertion that the right to sell liquor is inalienable was
severely criticized in the dissenting opinion, which ited numerous
authorities; among them several decisions of these same judges,
who now declared it to be an inalienable right, to the effect that
local option laws were constitutional and thatthe State could pro-
hibit sales of liquor outside of the limits of incorporated cities,
towns and villages.
Under the Denver City Charter, the governor of Colorado is
.empowered to appoint the fire and police commissioners of the
city, and the power to suspend or remove them without judicial
investigation is also given with the provision that the suspension
or removal is to be made for a cause, not political, stated in writ-
ing. Governor Waite removed two commissioners in accordance
with this provision and appointed two others to fill the vacant
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offices. The incumbents refused to surrender the office, and the
governor applied to the Supreme Court of the State, in accord-
ance with the clause in the constitution permitting the governor
to call on it for an extra-judicial opinion, for an answer to the
question as to what persons were legally entitled to hold the office,
stating, of course, the circumstances. Several other questions
involved in the statement of the facts are settled by the opinion.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Goddard, J., first declares
its reluctance to give an opinion in response to executive or legis-
lative questions that might affect private rights and interests, but
in view of the gravity of the situation, which the governor submit-
ted to be one of great danger to life and property, considers the
question. The power to appoint and remove is expressly given to
the governor, if the cause is not political and is stated in writing.
But having removed 'an incumbent and appointed his successor,
he is under no obligation to install him in office, and his constitu-
tional oath to " take care that the laws are faithfully executed,"
imposes no obligation on him to do so, and the power conferred
on him I to call out the militia of the State to execute the laws,"
does not authorize the forcible induction of an appointee in office.
The laws here referred to mean right or remedy provided by law,
and the militia can only be called out to secure enforcement of
such right or remedy, or the time of insurrection. The proper
method of determining who is entitled to the office is through the
the courts, when the incumbent questions the appointment by the
executive, and the Supreme Court will not determine this ques-
tion in an ex tarte response to the governor's inquiry. The con-
clusion we come to from this opinion is, that in such cases, it is
the business of the parties contesting the appointment, and not of
the governor making it to bring the question into court and settle
it.
The case of Ellis, Attorney General, ex rel. Reynolds v. .Afay, 58
N. W. Rep. 483, is an interesting contest of an election. The
suit is an information i n the nature of quo warranto to determine
which of two candidates received the greater number of legal
votes cast for the office of county clerk. At the first count the
relator received a small majprity, but when, in accordance with
an act of the legislature, the votes were re-counted, the respon-
dent was found to have a majority. On trial before a jury of the
cause in the Circuit Court, the respondent was found to have
received a majority of the votes. In this case, although many
questions are raised in the pleadings, the principal point is whether
222
COMMENT.
certain votes should be counted or not. These votes were marked
by inspectors, who did it under a wrong interpretation of the law
providing that "when any elector shall make oath that he can
not read English, or that because of physical inability he can not
mark his ballot, or when such disability shall be made manifest to
the election inspectors," the inspector should do it for him. The
court held that this section was mandatory and the oath was a
necessary preliminary, and, since the ballots could not be marked
before it was made, the votes so cast were void and could not be
counted. It was argued that this provision was unconstitutional
in that it imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right to vote,
but the court held that these regulations were intended to pre-
serve the purity and freedom of the ballot and that every pre-
sumption was in their favor. Where the illegal votes can be sep-
arated from the legal votes cast, the illegal votes should be taken
from the total vote proportionately, according to the entire vote
in the district for each candidate. The result of this decision was
that the relator was declared to have received the mafority of the
votes at the election (which took place in 1892), and a judgment
of ouster against the respondent was found.
